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r 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs- No. 14840 
JOHNNIE OWEN WADE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged in a criminal proceeding by 
the State of Utah, with three counts of automobile homicide 
in violation of Utah Code Annotated, §76-5-207 (Supp. 1977). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On September 27, 1976, appellant was found guilty of 
automobile homicide, as charged in the information, by 
Judge Allen B. Sorensen, sitting without a jury, in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court, in an for Utah County, State of Utah, 
and was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 0 to 5 years 
in the Utah State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the judgment of 
the court b 
........._ elow. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Late in the evening of May 10, 1976, a pick-up 
truck and a small, foreign car crashed head-on along a stre: 
of Highway 91, approximately two miles west of Goshen, Utah, 
Killed in the crash were Mrs. Thomas (Debra) Cox and her tic 
small children, Melinda and Jeremy. Injured were Thomas Co; 
and appellant, who was subsequently charged with automobile 
homicide. 
At trial, waitress Myrna Butler, an employee of 
Walt's Cafe in Santaquin, Utah, testified that she served 
three pitchers of beer and no food to two men whom she ident:·' 
fied as appellant and his companion, Leo Craig Finster, on 
1 
I 
the night of May 10, 1976. (T.17) Appellant arrived at the, 
cafe at approximately 7: 30 p.m. and left about 10:30 with I 
Leo Finster. (T.18) Ms. Butler testified that as the two I 
left, one man commented to the other, "Well, you will havetoi 
I 
drive." (T.18) I 
Leo Finster testified that he and appellant I 
talked and drank beer at Walt's Cafe on the evening of Mayll1 
1 ft Finster til nearly eleven o'clock. (T.23) As the two e ' I 
· f · d h 11 k d h · i· f he wanted to drive. testi ie t at appe ant as e im 
the hO~e o' ! 
Finster said he did and drove appellant's truck to 
t" 
As appellant returned from ' appellant's girlfriend. (T.24) 
1 t) was house to the truck, he told Finster he (the appel an 
. how to d:Jive. 1: going to drive, that he would show Finster 
-2-
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With appellant driving, the two men headed west 
out of Santaquin on the two-lane State Highway 91. According to 
Finster, they crossed a set of railroad tracks and appellant 
t:egan going around a curve when Finster saw a set of headlights 
coming toward them which appeared to be crossing into their lane. 
(T. 27 -34) Then the two vehicles crashed. (T. 27) Finster 
also testified that he told passerby Mike Okelberry that he was 
not driving. (T .13) Shorty after the accident, Leo Finster 
consented to a blood alcohol test, which determined that the 
~rcent of alcohol in his blood was 0.08% (State's Exhibit #6). 
The third state's witness was Thomas Cox, the driver 
of the vehicle in which the fatalities occurred. Mr. Cox 
testified that on May 10, 19 76, he had completed his workday 
for the Kennecott Copper Corporation at the Burgen Mine at 
10:40 p.m., and that his wife had picked him up. (T.35-36) 
At approximately 11:00 o'clock he, his wife, and their two young 
children were travelling east on State Highway 91 toward their 
home in Payson, Utah. (T.37) Mr. Cox was driving his 1974 
Honda at approximately 55 mph. (T.36-37) He testified he 
crossed one set of railroad tracks without any difficulty and 
then noticed an oncoming set of lights that appeared to be moving 
toVlard him in the eastbound lane. (T.39) Cox testified that 
the headlights seemed on the north shoulder of the road, with 
the oncoming vehicle kicking up dust. (T.39) Cox looked 
-3-
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toward his wife, exclaimed, "Now what do I do"? and swerved!: 
car to the left. (T. 4 o- 41) Mr. Cox cone 1 uded his testimony 
by stating he swerved to the left, into the westbound lane, 
because he believed staying where he was or m · t h ov ing o t e ri~'· 
would have surely resulted in a head-on crash, whereas if the 
driver of the oncoming car maintained his position in the 
eastbound lane, a collision would be avoided. (T.41) (Steve~. 
Hancock, Director of the Payson Hospital Blood Bank, testifiea 
that after Thomas Cox signed the consent form (at 12:06 a.m.)
1 
he withdrew blood from Mr. Cox for a blood alcohol analysis 
(T. 68), the results of which were entered into evidence as 
State's Exhibit # 7 and which state that Cox's blood contained 
0.00% alcohol.) 
The state then cal led Dr. J. Robert Hogan, a physi· 
cian who testified that Debra, Melinda and Jeremy Cox all 
received fatal facial and head injuries in the accident, and 1 
that all were dead on arrival at Payson Hospital. 
· k testified Utah Highway Patrol Trooper David Nusin 
that at approximately 1: 15 a.m., May 11, 1976, he arrested 
· t 1 f automobi' le homicide. appellant at Payson Hospi a or 
(T. 57) 
said he wanted to ' He read appellant his rights, and appellant 
killed. 
make one statement, whereupon he asked if anyone was 
. d in the 
Officer Nusink responded that three persons had die 
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accident. (T.58) He testified that appellant then stated 
that he had not been driving the vehicle. (T. 58) The 
officer then reported tr.at he asked appellant if he would 
submit to a blood alcohol test; he testified that appellant 
said he would allow the test. {T.59) A registered nurse at 
Payson General Hospital, Jewel Roberts, testified that at 
1:20 a.m., May 11, she withdrew the blood for that test: 
entered into evidence as State's Exhibit #5 were the test results, 
which state that appellant's alcohol level in his blood was 
0.12%. (T. 64) 
Dr. Albert Swenson, a biochemist, verified the 
hlood alcohol results of the three men tested {T. 72) and 
further testified that in his opinion, the level of alcohol in 
appellant's blood at the time of the accident would· have been 
0.15 - 0.16%. (T. 76) 
On direct examination, Michael Okelberry testified 
that he was travelling behind the Cox car on Route 91 when he 
saw headlights corning from the east. From a distance of 
approximately a half mile, he saw the headlights of the 
oncoming car and the taillights of the Cox car both go out near 
the railroad tracks. (T.85) He realized something was wrong, 
stopped at the scene, and rendered assistance. (T.85-90) 
Finally, he stated that Leo Finster told him that he was not 
driving the truck. (T. 91) 
-5-
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Officer Gary Johnson of the Utah flighway Patrol \:as 
called to testify as an accident investigator. (T.96) He 
testified that the point of impact was 5' 5" north of the center 
line in the westbound lane. (T. 99) 
Officer Nusink was recalled. He testified that he 
and Lt. Newell Knight of the Utah Highway Patrol went to the 
accident scene on May 13 and made numerous measurements of 
His findings were that 37 feet back fron 
the point ~f impact, the westbound truck was ~;pletely in the I 
skid marks. (T.124) 
I (T .124-125) The officer also testified concerr,-\ 
ing the written statement (State's Exhibit #22) that appellant 
eastbound lane. 
had made in :;us ink's presence. (T .110-111) 
Officer Nusink reported that in response to his 
question, appellant stated that he had turned his steering 
wheel to the right in an attempt to avoid the collision; appel-
lant then made this directional notation in his written state-
ment. (T .111) 
The defense offered the testimony of David H. Lord, 
an accident reconstructionist, who stated his opinion that the 
two vehicles might not have been in the attitudes prior to 
impact as described by Officer Johnson, offering instead P 
alternate theory. (T.142-153) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS SUFFICIENT TO 
PROVE APPELLANT GUILTY OF AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE· 
-6- J Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The fundamental rule governing an appeal on a claim 
of insufficient evidence was restated recently by this court in 
state v. Hilson, 565 P. 2d 66,68 (Utah 1977): 
"The judging of the credibility of the 
witnesses and the weight of the evi-
dence is exclusively the prerogative of 
the jury. Consequently, we are obliged 
to assume that the jury believed those 
aspects of the evidence, and drew those 
inferences that reasonably could be 
drawn therefrom, in the light favorable 
to the verdict. In order for the defen-
dant to successfully challenge and 
overturn a verdict on the ground of 
insufficiency of the evidence, it must 
appear that upon so viewing the evidence, 
reasonable minds must necessarily 
entertain a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant corunitted the crime." 
In the instant case the judge was sitting as the 
trier of fact, appellant having waived a jury trial. (T. 3) 
Under the Wilson rule, the evidence is sufficient to uphold the 
judgement of the court below. 
Judge Sorensen made these findings at the close of 
trial: 
1. That appellant was driving a public vehicle on 
a public highway under the influence of intoxicating liquor; 
2. That appellant was negligent in that he was on 
the wrong side of the road; 
3. That appellant's negligence was a cause of the 
death of each f th · d · h f th t o e persons containe in eac o e coun SJ 
anc: 
-7-
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4. That although appellant was not criminally 
negligent under the statute, he was guilty of the crime 
charged. (T.172) Utah Code Annotated §76-5-207 (Supp. 1977) : 
I I 
provides that an actor who is under the influence of an intoxi-1 
eating liquor, to a degree which renders him incapable of safe:. I 
., 
driving a vehicle, causes the death of another by operating a 
motor vehicle in a negligent manner is guilty of automobi~ 
homicide. 
Evidence in the record supports the trial court's 
findings that each element of the crime was present. It is 
undisputed that at the time of the blood alcohol test~dehnH 
witness Finster had 0. 08% alcohol in his blood, which under 
Utah Code Annotated §41-6-44(3) (Supp. 1977),gives rise to the 
presumption that Finster was under the influence of alcohol. 
It is further undisputed that appellant's alcohol level at the 
time of his test was 0 .12%, which under Utah Code Annotated 
§41-6-44.2 (Supp. 1977),made it unlawful for him to have been 
driving. It is also undisputed that the driver of the second 
car, Thomas Cox, had 0.00% alcohol in his blood. Therefore, 
in light of the two versions of events precipitating the 
accident, it was within the discretion of the trier of £act to 
believe the Cox version, the testimony of a man who was comple-
tely sober as he drove along a straight stretch of road, as 
opposed to a passenger in another vehicle, under the influence 
of alcohol, riding in the truck of appellant, who himself was 
-8-
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i 
.I 
I 
!/ 
.... 
unlawfully behind the steering wheel. The credibility of the 
Cox version is supported by physical evidence in the finding of 
Gfficer Johnson that 37 feet back frorr. the point of impact the 
truck was entirely in the wrong lane. pickup (T. 99) 
consequently, the findings of the trial court, being 
bot!: reasonable and in accord with sufficient, competent evi-
aence, should be undisturbed by this court. 
POINT II 
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE IS NOT AN ELEMENT OF 
THE CRIME OF AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE. 
Appellant urges that this Court reconsider and over-
rule its position in State v. Durrant, 561 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1977) 
and State v. Anderson, 561P.2d1056 (Utah 1977), wherein this 
Court specifically held that: 
"Simple negligence in the driving of a motor 
vehicle which causes the death of another 
person is all that is required when the driver 
is so under the influence of liquor as to be 
unable to drive his car in a reasonably safe 
and prudent manner." 
(Anderson at p. 1063). To the contrary, respondent maintains 
that in those cases this court properly and reasonably concluded 
that automobile homicide is unique among the various kinds of 
criminal homicide as simple negligence is the standard against 
which the behavi· or i· s to be gauged. 1 d Consequent y, respon ent 
asks that this Court affirm the judgment of the court below. 
The Utah rule has always been that automobile 
homicide is an 
offense requiring simple negligence when the 
driv · 
er 15 under the influence of alcohol and causes the death 
-9-
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2:: 
( 13 5~) , Eis!:, ::2s P.2.:. 2:._:; 
statt:e, Uta:: :o:ie .. ~.r:...""lota.teC. §76-31:.:-7.~ (1933), a5 3....-:-.e::CeC:, 
the legisla~:.-.·e ~ ..., .... .=,~~ --- __ .... _ - , 
··=~ see.=s e':',.-iG.e::-= t..11.a~ ::·..:= Le~is:..at:.:re !las 
co:-_=: ·.;ded t.=:a--:. t.:_e '"::i=.e ::-_as :r-.::-""- C:lLe wher. 
we :::r..:s~ reca·~::ize that a::y f:i::=. of vehi-
c~:a= ne~lige~ce, raing~e~ ~i~~ g~s ar~ 
Cccze, p~oC.l..:ces a le~::.al =.ix~:.:.re th3.t, i: 
it ca:.:.se deat~, should pe::a:ize to a greater 
Cegree tha~ ~e=~=e, t~e =o~ile, tipsy 
ve.."licle-operati:i.g bre·,.·-:::aster, in order to 
bring to a screeching ha:t the :::ow:ting 
holocaust daily dedicated t:o traffic 
fatali~ies." (IC.. at 102C). 
7he ne·..r stat'~te, Gtah cc.:.e .:\nr..otc.tee'. )76-s-2:· 
(Supp. 1977), provides: 
"Cr L-ninal ho:::-.icide co::st:i t:.:.tes a·.: tc:::icl::: ile 
homicide if the actor, w:.ile ur.der t:l""e 
influence of int8xi=2'"::i::q li~~c= . .. ~2 ~ 
degree which renders tr.e actor i::-~ca;:ia;ile 
of safely drivi:i.g a vehic:e, ca~ses the 
death of anotl:er by opera~ing a :::ctcr 
vehic:e in a neglige::~ :::2::::er." 
j Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
f 
l 
:..s to 
::J.ri·.-ers of autor:tobile ho::licide 
--- .::: 
-· 
C-lr. Justice Eer:riod' s 
in 1973 with the 
=::::;:::::::: :: : t:::e ne·,.; s'::a:::.:. ::e, as alcohol related highway fat.a-
?.es:;;onder:':: s·..:::;::-.i':;s that if crir:cinal negligence were 
-·o s::e.:::::.ar::: ':;!".at §75-5-207 would, in fact, be surplusage as 
5·~-;-2:: .- :::-::·.·i::J.es t:-,a'= "cri.":lir.al homicide constitutes 
.:e;:.:.;e.::t :.c:::icide if t::e actor, acting with criminal negligence, 
If indeed the Legislature 
::::"-:::ec :::::li- ::o :::a?:e the alcohol related vehicular homicide a 
:::e se-,-ere :::::er:se, it could have acded to §76-5-206 (2) that 
:e;:1;er:t :-.a:::.iciC.e is a felor:y of the third degree if the actor 
:.o ~ ·:e2i:::le driver uncer -the influence of alcohol. 
Furthen::.ore, ~henever possible or reasonable, statutes 
=== :::::-.s::r:.:.eC. to be r..eanin:;ful in ther:iselves, neither repetitious 
::c= :i.:.s:.a=.onious with other statutes. Given the liI!litations 
.::=..::Code Anr:otated §76-5-201(1) (Supp. 1977), it is certainly 
=0 0.sc::~.:.e to view the auto!:'.obile homicide statute as an out-
:::·,:::-_ ::-: tr_e reci<:.less::ess provision, rather than the criminal 
.:E:s::;=~::e ele.i.-::ent; for reckless driving is a lesser included 
:::e:.se c: driving under the influence. 
5 ~>6-4-L2 is per se a reckless driver. 
-11-
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convicted under §76-5-207, a driver has acted recklessly in 
that he drove while intoxicated and he has acted negligently by 
performing the behavior which caused the fatality, i.e., veering 
across the center line. Given these considerations, it was 
reasonable and proper that the court in Durrant (supra) and 
Anderson (supra) determined that simple negligence was the 
appropriate, legislatively-intended standard. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the evidence was sufficient to susta~the 
judgment and simple negligence is the appropriate standard of 
culpability in automobile homicide cases, respondent urges this 
court to affirn the judgment of the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
EARL F • DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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